By Jean Baptiste Ndabananiye
Weapons of mass destruction are often treated as topics of a past era—an unfinished Cold War chapter supposedly contained by treaties, deterrence, and strategic restraint. Yet this framing is increasingly outdated. The more advanced global security systems become, the less predictable and less controllable their consequences appear. The world is not simply debating catastrophic weapons—it is quietly normalizing the conditions under which their use becomes thinkable again.
The dominant assumption is that technological progress increases control. In practice, the opposite dynamic is emerging. As military systems become more integrated with cyber, space, artificial intelligence, intelligence, and conventional domains; responsibility becomes fragmented across interdependent systems. This creates a central contradiction: today greater awareness of catastrophic risks is accompanied by expanding pathways for escalation. We understand more, yet control less. The result today is a strategic environment in which worst-case scenarios are no longer exceptional—they are increasingly incorporated into the logic of global security itself.
Weapons of mass destruction include nuclear, biological and chemical weapons. “Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. One can destroy a whole city, potentially killing millions, and jeopardizing the natural environment and lives of future generations through its long-term catastrophic effects. Biological weapons disseminate disease-causing organisms or toxins to harm or kill humans, animals or plants. They can be deadly and highly contagious. Diseases caused by such weapons would not be confined to national borders. The modern use of chemical weapons began with World War I, when both sides to the conflict used poisonous gas to inflict agonizing suffering and to cause significant battlefield casualties,” explains the UN.
A volatile convergence: technology, warfare, and the growing nuclear danger
At a time when the architecture of global security is facing unprecedented strain, the specter of weapons of mass destruction is re-emerging not as a distant Cold War subject, but as an immediate and evolving threat molded by new technological and geopolitical realities.
This moment is marked by a dangerous paradox: while the risks associated with nuclear escalation and other weapons of mass destruction are becoming more complex and less predictable, the global mechanisms designed to manage them are increasingly fragmented, politicized, and ill-equipped to respond.
Against the backdrop, insights from leading experts like Wilfred Wan and findings from institutions like the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute and the Global Challenges Foundation raise a rapidly deteriorating strategic landscape.
“Mounting geopolitical tensions and rapid technological advances are eroding long-standing safeguards against weapons of mass destruction. As global regimes falter and enforcement weakens, the world faces growing risks of proliferation, misuse, and strategic instability. Understanding these shifts is essential for strengthening governance and preventing catastrophic escalation in an increasingly volatile security landscape,” reads the Global Catastrophic Risks 2026 Report by Global Challenges Foundation.
Wilfred Wan works as the Director of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) Weapons of Mass Destruction Program. His recent research focuses on nuclear weapon risk reduction, nuclear disarmament verification, and other issues related to arms control and disarmament. He has written an article relating to the report which the foundation has released.
Wan, through the article, highlights “Rapid technological advances and expanding multi-domain warfare are reshaping global security, blurring lines between nuclear and conventional conflict. As cyber, space, artificial intelligence (AI) and disinformation capabilities converge, escalation risks grow increasingly unpredictable.
Recent and ongoing conflicts demonstrate the increasingly complex nature of contemporary warfare. Understanding these dynamics is essential for strengthening governance, preventing miscalculation, and reducing the mounting danger of nuclear use in a volatile strategic environment.”
He states that modern warfare now encompasses multiple operational domains and features the convergence of advanced technological capabilities. He provides an example of the Russia’s war against Ukraine. “For instance, on the eve of the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, a massive cyber operation was attributed to Moscow by the European Union, the United Kingdom and the United States. The operation targeted Viasat’s KA-SAT network — disrupting broadband satellite access, internet access and critical infra-structure across Ukraine.
In the ensuing war, Ukraine has arguably achieved its greatest battlefield success through the large-scale use of drones likely trained by AI. For instance, a June 2025 attack from Ukraine resulted in damage to over 40 Russian strategic bombers in air-fields across the country — undermining Russia’s nuclear forces in the process. Israel’s military campaign in Gaza since October 2023 has reportedly included AI-enabled decision-support systems to inform targeting decisions. The May 2025 military conflict between India and Pakistan also featured a wave of AI-generated content.”
Artificial intelligence [AI] and space figure among key aspects which, Wan highlights, aggravate the situation. “Indeed, the deployment of AI and other capabilities, particularly involving nuclear-armed states, is fundamentally changing notions of escalation. Warfighting on the ground, at sea and in the air could spill over into space and cyber domains or be triggered by ongoing dynamics there. One reason for the multi-domain nature of contemporary warfare is that modern weapons are increasingly reliant on space-based assets and digital communications technology, creating new vectors of vulnerability.”
According to him, multi-domain operations that escalate introduce potential for nuclear weapon use — a scenario which is heightened in the current global context. It adds that increasing interactions between nuclear and non-nuclear strategic capabilities, including those linked to cyber and space domains, can blur the distinction between intended military targets. The report also highlights that the interactions can amplify potential conflicts and raise questions as to the strategic rationale behind operations.
“This opens the door for potential miscalculations, misperceptions and misunderstandings, with escalation in these circumstances taking place in an ‘accelerated and decidedly non-linear’ fashion. This challenge is compounded by the ‘lack of collective experience, common under-standings and established behavioural norms’ that might otherwise deescalate tense situations.
These gaps are particularly evident when new technologies or domains are involved. For instance, had Russia perceived a deliberate intent by the West to undermine its nuclear forces as means of inflicting ‘strategic defeat’ — a declared objective — through Ukraine’s June 2025 drone operation, the results could have been more escalatory and catastrophic, potentially breaching the firewall between conventional and nuclear warfare.”
He reminds the world “Policymakers and military officials across the nine nuclear-armed states are increasingly using provocative nuclear language and making threats, threating the longstanding normative taboo against nuclear use. Some have amended their official policies to widen the circumstances in which they would consider nuclear use, including as response to non-nuclear strategic attacks or to pre-empt aggression by non-nuclear armed states.”
“The presence of multi-domain operations and the impact of new technologies is also paradoxically driving greater reliance on nuclear capabilities, feeding into arms race dynamics and longer-term destabilisation. Widespread recognition of complex escalation pathways is not inspiring risk mitigation or the diffusion of tensions. On the contrary, there is a dangerous tendency among states to believe they can control escalation with their advanced capabilities. This ‘false sense of supremacy’ tends to lead to more aggressive behaviour. Overall, nuclear-armed states are pursuing strategic advantages through new technologies, further worsening the dynamics that define the deteriorated strategic context.”
Wan insists that these circumstances have just compounded the crisis which the world is unprepared to remedy. “Given these circumstances, it is especially concerning that global governance appears ill-equipped to address this more complex security environment: both in terms of preventing multi-domain escalation pathways from materialising and by reversing longer-term trends and thinking regarding strategic capabilities. Multilateral deliberations on nuclear, cyber and outer space domains remain siloed with limited engagement across communities.
Exploration of the intersection between nuclear weapons and emerging and disruptive technologies has thus far been narrowly focused — notably on the integration of AI into nuclear command, control and communications systems. While this is an important topic, arguably more concerning are the broader trends that contribute to the entanglement of conventional and nuclear missions and the risk of multi-domain escalation.”
He indicates that there are other important actors who are left outside discussions meant for managing nuclear weapons. “Moreover, dialogue platforms for strategic — and nuclear — issues centre on traditional powers, leaving little space for civil society, private sector and even non-nuclear weapon states to engage. The strategic implications of conventional operations in Ukraine, Gaza and South Asia underscore the need for a more inclusive conversation.”
In Wang’s view, what will save the planet from the crisis?
“Pragmatic steps to reduce the risk of multi-domain escalation alone will not resolve any underlying geopolitical tensions or arms racing dynamics. But ensuring the relevance of de-escalation mechanisms, and creating new ones, is a necessary and urgent endeavour that can help prevent worst case scenarios while rebuilding much-needed trust and confidence among nuclear-armed adversaries,” says Wang.
He explains that this revolves around developing a shared strategic value structure. “For instance, in the outer space domain, where kinetic operations are unprecedented, or in the cyber domain, where operations have increased in frequency and intensity. It is imperative that states maintain common understandings on thresh-olds, including those pertaining to nuclear use.
Exchanging views on actions seen as escalatory can establish behavioural parameters, constituting a new approach to arms control. This can also facilitate the outlining of procedures to address risky or provocative behaviours that are seen to take place. Additional tools, such as hotlines, pre-notifications and information exchange, can also be implemented.”
He further says that at the same time, there arises a need to reform the global governance system so that it is more adept and fit-for-purpose in addressing these new strategic realities. “This includes a more forward-looking approach to tackling technological developments in nuclear structures: for instance, through systematic evaluation and exchange in a subsidiary body of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty review process.
The Scientific Advisory Group of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons provides a model, as do other examples outside the nu-clear space: for instance, ongoing discussions of a science and technology review mechanism in the context of the Biological Weapons Convention.”
He emphasizes that the overlooked actors should be involved at this level. “This also highlights the importance of including the private sector and industry actors, who are not only responsible for driving many of these technological developments but will likely be involved in multi-domain operations on the battlefield — as seen in the role of SpaceX and the war in Ukraine.
Engaging these parties in key conversations — such as at the national security level and in multilateral governance fora — can help mitigate inadvertent escalation scenarios linked to third-party involvement.”
Wang argues that further changes to global governance will necessitate revisiting the concepts and assumptions that have long governed the current post-World War II system. “This includes reckoning with increasingly potent advanced precision-strike capabilities that are bridging the conventional-nuclear divide and considering these in future nuclear arms control negotiations and frameworks.”
According to him, it requires reconsidering not only how new technologies can impact the vulnerability of nuclear forces and upend strategic stability and deterrence stability, “but also revisiting how key states — nuclear and non-nuclear armed states alike — define those concepts in the context of multi-domain realities.
It includes leveraging existing UN forums — such as those on autonomous and outer space systems — to raise issues of cross- and multi-domain issues. At the same time, it involves gauging the political viability of creating new, dedicated platforms that encompass a more comprehensive approach to addressing escalation risk and strategic instability.”
Wang points out that multi-domain escalation risk has turned into part and parcel of the nuclear landscape. He further says that to date, nuclear-armed and nuclear-allied states have responded largely by expanding the scope of deterrence and the role of nuclear weapons. “But doing so can widen strategic and operational ambiguity in a manner that makes risk unmanageable. States need to reconsider how their actions can set into motion action-reaction cycles with long-lasting destabilising effects. To begin, states need to refocus on avoiding the worst possible outcome.
By identifying opportunities to reduce multi-domain escalation risks, by explicitly addressing new pathways through updated, innovative and encompassing risk reduction mechanisms, states and other stakeholders can begin to concretely account for increasing asymmetries across capabilities. Yet, this constitutes only a short-term solution.”
As the global security landscape grows more complex and unpredictable, incremental adjustments are no longer sufficient to manage emerging risks. The need for a more inclusive and adaptive framework of governance has become increasingly urgent, particularly in restoring trust and stability in arms control efforts, according to Wang. “At the same time, states will need to build a foundation for comprehensive frameworks that not only rebuild confidence and enhance military transparency, but help account for the more complex security environment.
This can be achieved through more inclusive platforms, prescribing additional modalities of action and reflecting new strategic value structures. Only this more ambitious approach to global governance can facilitate longer-lasting solutions and the revitalisation of arms control and disarmament efforts.”
Feasibility of Wang’s suggestion
While Wang compellingly outlines the growing dangers posed by multi-domain warfare and emerging technologies, he leaves significant questions about the feasibility of the proposed solutions. The call for more inclusive and adaptive global governance frameworks assumes a level of cooperation among states that is increasingly difficult to achieve in a fragmented geopolitical environment. Such calls have long been delivered but they have attained little.
In practice, major powers often prioritize strategic advantage over collective security, undermining efforts to construct shared norms and transparent mechanisms. The recommendation to involve diverse actors, such as the private sector and civil society, is normatively appealing but operationally complex, particularly in sensitive security domains like nuclear policy.
Moreover, the idea of establishing common thresholds and behavioral parameters across cyber, space, and nuclear domains presupposes consensus on what constitutes escalation—an agreement that has historically been elusive. Efforts to enhance transparency, such as information sharing and pre-notification mechanisms, may also face resistance from states wary of exposing strategic vulnerabilities.
The proposal to reform existing multilateral frameworks or create new platforms does not fully account for institutional inertia and competing political interests that often stall such initiatives. Additionally, the expectation that states will move from deterrence-driven postures toward risk reduction overlooks the enduring centrality of deterrence in national security doctrines.
Wang also seems to underestimate the challenge of aligning technological innovation—largely driven by private and competitive interests—with global regulatory objectives. While the need for urgent action is convincingly articulated, the pathway from recognition to implementation remains insufficiently developed. Ultimately, he highlights what should be done but leaves unresolved the critical question of how these ambitious reforms can be realized in practice.